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The paper shows that Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is a device to enhance
potential litigants’ bargaining position rather than to re-allocate risk. Being
insured decreases the cost an insured party has to bear if settlement negotia-
tions fail and the case goes to trial. This shifts the threat points, which has
an impact on the bargaining result. In negative expected value suits, LCI
can make the threat to sue credible and motivate potential defendants to
make positive settlement oﬀers. Hence, even risk-neutral agents may ﬁnd it
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In this paper, I analyze Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) as a strategic device rather than
a tool to re-allocate risk. This analysis provides a new explanation why risk-neutral
agents may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to purchase insurance1. Legal Cost Insurance inﬂuences
the interaction of the insured with other agents, e.g in settlement negotiations. This
strategic approach has not been focussed on yet2. Under the strategic point of view,
it is not the aspect of risk-allocation that makes LCI beneﬁcial for potential litigants,
but the improvement of their strategic position in a law suit. The model shows that
risk-neutral potential litigants may have an incentive to purchase LCI even when the
inurance premium exceeds the actuarial fair rate. This contradicts a standard result of
insurance theory3. According to this traditional literature, demand for insurance at a
premium above the fair rate should be explained by risk-aversion. Goldberg (1990)
argues against the usefulness of this easily made ad-hoc assumption and calls for more
fruitful explanations, such as institutional economic models. The strategic impact of
insurance is an attempt to contribute to this line of research.
1LCI and risk-averse plaintiﬀs are analyzed in Rickman/Heyes (1998).
2There is a growing literature on insurance for risk-neutral agents, starting with Mayers/Smith
(1982); see Skogh (1998) or Williams/Smith/Young (1998, 46) for an overview. This literature
focusses additional services that make insurance beneﬁcial, such as tax advantages, the professional
handling of settlements, or the evaluation of risks.
3See e.g. Rothschild/Stiglitz (1976).
2LCI has two strategic eﬀects in a game with settlement and trial. First of all, LCI can
make the plaintiﬀ’s threat to sue credible even if the case has a negative expected value
(NEV)4. The second strategic eﬀect of LCI is to shift the bargaining range and therefore
the settlement result. This eﬀect can make LCI attractive for both of the litigants even
in a positive expected value (PEV) suit.
The idea to turn a NEV case into a positive expected value case by distributing the
litigation costs over time is due to Bebchuk (1996). However, he analyzes retainer fees
rather than legal cost insurance5 Retainers diﬀer from LCI in two aspects:
• Under the British rule, a prevailing plaintiﬀ gets reimbursement for retaining fees,
but not for the insurance rate he has paid, thus the retainer is not entirely sunk,
whereas the insurance fee is sunk.
• Under both the British and the American rule, the retainer and the residual fee add
up to the total litigation costs, whereas the sum of insurance fee and deductible
do not necessarily add up to the litigation costs.
Legal Cost Insurance also diﬀers from other tools to reduce the cost risk of potential
plaintiﬀs, such as contingent fees (under LCI, the incentive scheme for the lawyer is
not modiﬁed) or from fee shifting (in Germany, fee shifting is combined with the rather
ubiquitous LCI).
Section 2 of this paper presents a simple model to demonstrate the strategic impact of
LCI. Even in this model, assuming perfect and complete information, hence a trial will
never occur, there are parameter settings under which the risk-neutral parties have an
incentive to purchase insurance. Two modiﬁcations of the basic model are discussed in
section 3: the rengotiation problem and divergent expectations. Section 4 presents the
results of the paper.
4Note that NEV suits are not necessarily meritless, see Bebchuk (1998). A legitimate suit can
have a negative expeceted value even if the probability to prevail in court is high, due to exces-
sively high litigation costs. A concept of legitimate and opportunistic suits is deﬁned in Kirstein,
R./Schmidtchen (1997).
5See also Bebchuk/Guzman (1996) and Croson/Mnookin (1996). The latter point out that non-
refundable retainers may have a strategic impact similar to the one described here, but admit that
the assumption of non-refundability might be problematic.
32. Trial, Settlement, and Insurance
2.1 Deﬁnitions
Consider a civil case - e.g. after an accident - where a plaintiﬀ P sues his opponent,
the defendant D, for a certain amount of money. Let this amount at stake be J > 0.
Both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral. Hence, an insurance against the risk of the
accident would not be bought by either party, if the premium is positive. Things are
diﬀerent with Legal Cost Insurance (LCI). Before the accident takes place, the parties
simultaneously decide whether to buy LCI or not.
After the accident, both parties are uncertain about the outcome of the case. Let me
denote the expected judgement of P as X, whereas the expected judgement of D is
denoted as Y . Each party assigns a positive probability to the events that either P is
awarded J, or zero otherwise. Hence, 0 < X < J and 0 < Y < J hold.
In section 2.3, I assume the expectations of the parties to be equal, thus X = Y . In such
a simple model, the parties will always settle (as long as trial costs are positive). A more
realistic view of settlement is provided in section 3.2, where the expectations are assumed
to be divergent. Since the amount at stake is known to both parties, this divergence is
caused by diﬀerent probability estimations to prevail. The subjective probability of P to
prevail is X/J, whereas D estimates to prevail with probability (J − Y )/J.
Under perfect and complete information, the parties should have consistent estimations:
their subjective probabilites to prevail add up exactly to 1. If, however, the sum of
these two subjective probabilities is greater than one, then the parties are bilaterally
optimistic6. In this case, X is close to J and Y is close to 0. This may lead to a situation
where settlement fails.
Before the trial takes place, the parties bargain over a settlement; for simplicity, I assume
bargaining costs to be zero. If the parties reach a settlement, the agreed upon amount
will be payed and the interaction ends. Let me denote this payment with S, labelled as
Si to distinguish diﬀerent parameter settings. For the sake of simplicity, I assume the
Nash bargaining solution with equal bargaining power7.
If the parties fail to settle, due to bilateral optimism, the plaintiﬀ P decides whether to
proceed to trial or not. In case of trial, an uninsured party has to bear trial costs of c.8 A
Legal Cost Insurance contract may require the insured party to bear a deductible in case
of trial. This deductible, denoted as d, may be diﬀerent for the two roles in court, but
again for simplicity, I assume that they are equal. Of course, the deductible is smaller
than the trial costs: d < c. The insurance fee is denoted as e for the plaintiﬀ and f for
6This concept is adapted from Polinsky (1989). Bilateral pessimism means a sum smaller than one.
7The main results of the paper could also be derived under more general assumptions concerning the
bargaining process and costs.
8The American cost allocation rule is applied here; under the British rule, the main results of this
paper would also hold. The assumption of equal trial costs only makes the results more handy and
could be relaxed without any problem.
4the defendant. Finally, let me deﬁne four expressions:
• Positive Expected Value (PEV): A case has a positive expected (net) value for P,
if X > c holds.
• Negative Expected Value (NEV): A case has a negative expected (net) value for
P, if X < c holds.
• The Credibility Condition (CC): d < X.
• h is the half of the amount covered by the LCI: h = c − d
2
2.2 The trial decision
Let me start the backward analysis of the interaction between P and D with the decision
of the former whether to proceed to trial or not, if settlement negotiations have failed.
If the plaintiﬀ P is uninsured, he expects a payoﬀ of X − c from going to court. If he
does not proceed to trial, his payoﬀ will be zero. Hence he prefers the trial in PEV cases
(X > c). In NEV cases, however, his threat to sue is non-credible.
If, however, P is insured, he expects X − d − e from trial, whereas his payoﬀ is −e if
he does not proceed to court. Therefore he prefers the trial if the Credibility Condition
(CC) is met: X > d. Obviously, the insurance fee does not inﬂuence his decision. The
fee is sunk before the players interact.
At this point, D has no direct inﬂuence on the decision of P. However, P’s decision has
an impact on his payoﬀs: If P stays out of court, an uninsured defendant D receives
a zero payoﬀ. Being insured leads to a payoﬀ of −f. If P proceeds to trial, D expects
−Y − c if not insured, and −Y − d − f. These expected payoﬀs are the parties’ threat
points in the settlement negotiations to be analyzed in the subsequent section.
2.3 Settlement under consistent expectations
First, I will analyze the settlement negotiations under the simplifying assumption that
the parties have consistent expectations, namely X = Y . Four cases are possible:
• no one is insured,
• only the plaintiﬀ P is insured,
• only the defendant D is insured,
• both are insured.
I ﬁrst examine positive expected value cases (section 2.3.1) and then turn to negative
expected value cases (section 2.3.3).
52.3.1 Postive expected value cases
If, in a PEV case, settlement fails, then P proceeds to trial. Without insurance, this
would bring him an expected payoﬀ of X − c. Hence, P would only accept a settlement
payment S that is at least as high as the expected payoﬀ from trial: S ≥ X −c. Without
LCI, D expects −X − c if settlement fails. Therefore, he would not accept to make a
settlement payment S if −S < −X − c. On the other hand, a settlement payment that
holds S ≤ X + c would be acceptable for D. From these considerations, the bargaining
range for a PEV case with uninsured parties can be derived as:
[X − c,X + c] (1)
In this ﬁrst case, the settlement result would be X. Let me now turn to the case where
only D is insured: His payoﬀ from trial then is −X−d−f. Hence, D would not accept any
settlement result that does not hold −S −f > −X −d−f or, equivalently, S < X +d.
The bargaining range now is
[X − c,X + d] (2)




= X − h
If only P is insured, then he expects X −d−e from a trial. Hence he would only accept
a settlement result if it holds S − e > X − d − e. Thus, the bargaining range is
[X − d,X + c] (3)
and the bargaining solution is X +h. Finally, if both parties are insured, the bargaining
range is
[X − d,X + d] (4)
and the solution is X. Under the assumptions made here, bilateral insurance leads to the
same result as no insurance at all. Obviously, it pays to be the only one who is insured,
since this causes a unilateral inward shift of the insured party’s threat point, which has
a beneﬁcial impact on settlement result.
2.3.2 The decision to buy insurance in PEV cases
The derived bargaining solutions minus the insurance premiums (if a party has purchased
LCI) provide the subgame value of the settlement and litigation stage of the interaction.
6These subgame values determine the decisions of the parties whether to insure or not.
Table 1 presents the simultaneous insurance decision as a game in strategic form. The
strategies are to insure (i) or not (n), the entries represent the expected payoﬀs of P and
D.
Table 1: Insurance stage, PEV case
D (n) (i)
P
−X −X + h − f
(n)
X X − h
−X − h −X − f
(i)
X + h − e X − e
(i) is the dominant strategy for P if e < h, and (n) is dominant if e > h. A similar
result holds for D: if f < h, then (i) is dominant; if f > h, then (n) is dominant. Hence,
the unique Nash equlibrium of this game depends on the exogenously given paramters
c,d,e and f. Figure 1 shows the Nash equilibrium for each of the possible parameter
combinations; recall that h is deﬁned as (c − d)/2.
If the inusrance fees are too low, then the pareto suboptimal Nash equlibrium (i),(i)
is implemented: both parties would be better oﬀ if there were no insurance available.
However, this arms race could be prevented by regulation; if the insurance fees for both
parties were set above h, they would not insure only to reach a more favorable settlement
result in PEV cases.
2.3.3 Settlement and insurance in NEV cases
Things are a bit diﬀerent if the case has negative expected value. Without LCI, P would
not proceed to trial if settlement fails. The bargaining range then is
[0,0] (5)
Note that this result is independet of whether D has bought insurance or not9: P has a
credible threat to sue, hence can force his opponent to accept a positive settlement result
if, and only if, he is insured. Then the bargaining ranges and settlement results are the
9Compared to the PEV case, bargaining range (5) replaces the bargaining ranges (1) and (2).









same as in the PEV case: If P is the only one who is insured, then baragining range (3)
applies and the bargaining result will be X + h; if both parties are insured, then it is
baragining range (4) and the settlement result is X. The simultaneous insurance game
for NEV cases is shown in table 2.






−X − h −X − f
(i)
X + h − e X − e
Obviously, the best answer of D on (n) is not to buy insurance, too. The best reply on
(i) depends on the parameters c,d and f; if f < h holds, D will also insure. If f > h
holds, then D will not buy insurance.
If D has chosen (n), then the best reply of P is (i) if e < X + h and (n) otherwise. If,
8on the other hand, D is insured, then P would also insure if e < X and not otherwise.
Figure 2 shows the possible Nash equilibria of the insurance stage in NEV cases.










If e is greater than X, but smaller than X+h, and simultaneously f < h holds, then the
game has no Nash equlibrium in pure strategies (denoted by the entry noNE in ﬁgure
2): If P were inusred, the best reply of D would be to insure, but the best reply of P
on (i) is not to insure; if P were not insured, then the best reply of D would be not to
inusre, too; yet P’s bets reply on (n) is to buy insurance.
Let me derive a normative result: If the legal system aims to protect the claim of P
(which is assumed to be legitimate), and wants to prevent that D buys LCI only for
redistributive purposes, then the insurance parameters d,e and f should be set such
that e < X +h and f > h hold (recall that h = (c−d)/2). This would lead to the Nash
equilibrium (i),(n) in the insurance stage, and implement a positive settlement result,
namely X +h. This is the maximum reward P can expect for his legitimate claim, given
an imperfect and costly court system. Under the additional condition e,f > h, this
would simultaneously prevent the parties from purchasing insurance if faced with PEV
cases. Hence, the optimal regulation for the LCI parameters would be h < e < X + h
and f > h. Without LCI, P would only revceive X in PEV cases and nothing in NEV
cases.
2.4 Risk-neutrality and the demand for LCI
The analysis above did show that parameter settings exist under which the parties in
a law suit would beneﬁt from being insured. The assumption of perfect and complete
9information lead to the (admittedly unrealistic) prediction that a trial never occurs.
Either the parameter settings are such that the parties settle, or the plaintiﬀ chooses
not to proceed to court.
If the probability of a trial is zero, the actuarial fair rate for an insurance would be zero.
However, the parameter settings that make insurance beneﬁcial for one party or both
do not exclude positive insurance premiums. Even though the parties are assumed to
be risk-neutral, the parties would accept an insurance that charges a premium above
the actuarial fair rate. It is the strategic eﬀect and not the aspect of risk-allocation that
creates a demand for LCI in this model.
3. Modiﬁcations of the basic model
3.1 NEV cases and the renegotiation problem
In the the former sections, the insurer only played a passive role. The insurance paramters
d,e and f were exogenously set and subject to a comparative static equlibrium analysis.
Furthermore, it was assumed that an insurance contract would be carried out exactly as
agreed upon. The latter assumption is closer examined in this section.
Consider an NEV case where only P has bought insurance. If settlement fails, then the
insurer and the plaintiﬀ would have an incentive to renegotiate their contract. This would
have a serious impact on the threat points of P and D in the settlement negotiations, if
anticipated by the defendant.
If the insurer made an oﬀer to buy back the contract, then P would have to decide
whether to accept or not. Let me denote an oﬀer with T. If P accepts, he reiceives T −e,
if he rejects, he could proceed to trial, which brings him an expected payoﬀ of X −d−e.
Hence, P would only accept oﬀers that hold T > X − d.
If P rejects the oﬀer, his insurer faces an expected loss of e + d − c (the insurer has to
bear c, but receives the deductible d). If P would not go to court, the insurer’s payoﬀ
would be e. Thus, the insurer would agree to a renegotiation payment T that holds
e − T > e + d − c or, equivalently, T < c − d. Therefore, the bargaining range between
P and the insurer is
[X − d,c − d] (6)
In NEV cases (X < c), this range is non-empty. The Nash bargaining solution would be
(X + c)/2. Both the insurer and the insured plaintiﬀ would beneﬁt from not carrying
out the contraact. However, if renegotiation could be expected to take place, D would
not have to expect his insured opponent to proceed to trial. The threat point of D then
is zero, even though P is insured. Of course, expecting no trial at all, D would also have
no incentive to buy insurance.
10If the opportunity to renegotiate were excluded, the parties would settle for X + h and
the payoﬀs of P, D, and the insurer were x+h−e,−X −h and e. P and his insurer use
the shadow of the court to extract an settlement payment out of D.
Facing the opportunity to renegotiate leads to payoﬀs (X +c)/2−e,0 and e−(X +c)/2
for P, D, and the insurer. The ex-post rational decision to renegotiate leads to a zero-sum
game between P and the insurer ex ante.
Obviously, it would be in the common interest of P and the insuerer to exclude the
possibility of renegotiation. This would make D expect a trial, if settlement fails, and
therefore induce him to accept a positive settlement result. This common interest leads to
some plausible explanations why, in reality, renegotiations between Legal Cost Insurers
and their customers are simply unheard of:
1. To protect their rent e from vanishing, insurers have a demand for regulation that
prevents renegotitation. Alternatively, insurers would be well advised to install
institutional arrangements that prevent renegotiations, even when these arrange-
ments are costly. Such an arrangement could be seen in insurance agents who do
not beneﬁt from renegotiations, but from making contracts. If the decision whether
to perform or to renegotiate is left to the agents (as it is in practice), the insurer’s
rent is protected.
2. Insurer and customers play a repeated game, which includes a sequence of one-
shot games between single plaintiﬀs and defendants (as in the model presented
here). According to the Folk theorem, there is a Nash equlibrium in the supergame
between insurer and insured that excludes renegotiations. The shadow of the future
keeps them from renegotiating in each single round.
3.2 Settlement under divergent expectations
In the sections above, another crucial assumption has been made in order to focus on
the role of LCI as a strategic insurance rather than a tool to re-allocate risk: Due to
perfect and complete informations, the parties would never actually proceed to trial.
Either a settlement takes place, or - in NEV cases with an uninsured plaintiﬀ - P would
not proceed to court. Hence, the insurer’s business is not risky at all. To buy Legal Cost
Insurance only has an impact on the settlement, but does not cover an actual risk, since
Legal Costs never have to be borne.
In this section, I will allow for the parties expectations to diverge. This leaves room for
the trial puzzle: Even if the objective bargaining range is non-empty, parties are observed
to proceed to court instead of reaching a settlement. Divergent expectations are caused
11from diﬀerent estimations of the probability that the plaintiﬀ prevails in court10
As deﬁned above, let the amount at stake be J. The expected award for the plaintiﬀ is
X, for the defendant Y . Trial costs are c. But now, the subjective probabilities of the
parties that the plaintiﬀ prevails may diﬀer from each other (and from the objective
one). The subjective probabilities that P prevails are X/J for P and Y/J for D. If both
parties are uninsured, then P would proceed to trial if the case has PEV: X > c. If this
condition holds, the bargaining range is
[X − c,Y + c]
This range is nonempty, and settlement takes place, if X − c ≤ Y + c or X − Y ≤ 2c.
Hence, settlement fails and a trial takes place if X > Y +2c, which implies PEV11. If, on
the other hand, the case has NEV, then P will not proceed to trial after the settlement
fails, and the bargaining range hence is [0,0] regardless of the subjective estimations of
D.
Note the diﬀerence to the consistent expectations model above: As above, P will only
proceed to court if X > c. Under consistent expectations, P will never actually have to
try the case, because a settlement is induced. The probability of a trial is zero. Here, if
X is greater than c and also exceeds 2c+Y , P would reject any settlement oﬀer that D
would ﬁnd acceptable and proceed to trial. Now, the probability of a trial is positive12.
For the analysis of LCI, this model has two impacts: First of all, if the insurer accepts
a customer, he now has to face the risk of having to bear litigation costs. Secondly, the
trial condition X > Y +2c is inﬂuenced by LCI. If one party is insured, this condition is
X > Y +c+d. The right hand side is now smaller than in the case without insurance. If
both parties are insured, the right hand side is Y +2d, which is even smaller. The more
insurance is bought, the more likely is the trial condition fulﬁlled.
10A simple idea to model this was introduced byPriest/Klein (1984): Let y be the true value of a case,
and ei be the error party i ∈ {P;D} estimates this true value with. Assume that ei is a continuous
random variable with zero mean. Let furthermore be s the decision standard of the judge. Then the
objective probability that P prevails is Pr{y > s}, the subjective probability of P is Pr{y+eP > s},
and for D it is Pr{y + eD > s}. Since ei are random variables, these subjective probabilities are
random variables, too. An alternative explanation of the trial puzzle is the asymmetric information
approach that was introduced by Bebchuk (1984) or Nalebuff (1988). For an overview and an
empirical comparision of these models see Waldfogel (1999). His data supports the divergent
expectations approach.









If the diﬀerence between the subjective probability of P and the one of D exceeds the ratio of
total trial costs and the ﬁxed amount at stake, then settlement fails and a trial occurs. This is the
trial condition of Priest/Klein (1984) under the assumption of zero bargaining costs; see also
Waldfogel (1999, 454).
12The probability of a trial is Pr{X − c > Y + c}, which is equivalent to X
J − Y
J > 2c
J . The right hand
side of the trial condition consists of two random variables, as explained above.
124. Conclusions
Let me list the results that were derived in the sections above:
• In positive expected value cases, it can be individually rational to purchase Legal
Cost Insurance in order to improve the settlement result.
• However, a pareto suboptimal Nash equilibrium can occur if the insurence pre-
miums are too low; this arms race can be prevented by high enough insurance
premiums.
• In negative expected value cases, Legal Cost Insurance can provide a credible threat
to sue and therefore induce a positive settlement result.
• The renegotiation problem between the insurer and his customer does not occur if
there is regulation (or an institutional arrangement) that prevents renegotiation,
of if the players take into account the shadow of the future.
• Under consistent expectations, LCI leads to more settlement, but not to more
trials. If, however, the parties’ expectations diverge, then LCI may induce more
trials.
Thus, LCI is a useful institution which is required to ensure legal protection for property
rights of low value, but does not necessarily lead to more litigation13. Note that these
results only hold if, as assumed above, the possibility of illegitimate or opportunistic
suits is excluded. Opportunistic suits taken into account, the impact of LCI may be
more harmful. However, even in this case one of the main results of this paper remains
valid: Risk-neutral parties may have a demand for strategic insurance at a premium that
exceeds the actuarial fair rate. LCI clearly is an example for such a strategic insurance.
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